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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes how the accumulation of liquidation rights
in a start-up can result in a suboptimal contract among the company's
investors and its management team. Liquidation rights determine the
allocation of the proceeds when a start-up is sold. Because a sale is the
most common form of exit for investors, these rights are a key factor
in determining the return to investors, the return to the company's
management team and employees, and the incentives of all parties
involved.
As a start-up grows and negotiates multiple rounds of financing,
liquidation rights accumulate. In the aggregate, these rights can cre-
ate a misalignment of interests and a suboptimal outcome for inves-
tors, the management team, and employees. The source of this
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problem is the sequential nature of the contracts involved;' each
round of investment involves a new negotiation of liquidation rights.
As new investors negotiate their rights, however, earlier investors'
rights are rarely renegotiated. In order to protect themselves from
the impact of later investors' liquidation rights, earlier investors often
seek rights that turn out to be counterproductive.2 This Article ana-
lyzes this phenomenon and suggests a contractual mechanism to coor-
dinate liquidation rights over time so that the sequential negotiation
of liquidation rights is less likely to result in a reduction in firm value.
I
THE PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS
One challenge to producing an optimal set of liquidation rights
for a start-up is the divergence of interests among the parties from the
start.3 To simplify slightly, the parties include founders and other
members of the management team, individual angel investors, and
venture capital funds. Investors' interests, which tend to be related to
the stage at which they invest in a start-up, are reflected in the liquida-
tion rights they seek to negotiate and in their decisions regarding exit.
Founders and the Management Team. Founders typically found
start-ups because they want to place a very large bet on their ideas and
their abilities. They are willing to work very hard, for low pay and for
many years, and to take very high risks for the chance to become rich
and famous.
1 We use the term "contract" to refer both to the terms governing a particular inves-
tor's investment and to the aggregate arrangement among all investors, the founder, and
key employees.
2 We are not claiming that renegotiations of earlier investors' rights do not occur,
only that there are impediments. In their study of venture capital financings, Kaplan and
Str6mberg found renegotiation of dividend or liquidation rights in nine percent of subse-
quent rounds. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REv. ECON. STUD. 281, 313
(2003). Fried and Broughman studied a sample of fifty start-ups that were sold and found
that renegotiation occurred in thirteen out of seventy-eight financing rounds. They also
found that, in the context of a pending sale, renegotiation of liquidation rights occurred in
eleven out of fifty transactions. Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash low
Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 389 (2010). The number of start-
ups that are not sold due to a failure to renegotiate these rights is unknown and probably
not precisely knowable, but in the experience of one of us (Venuto), this is a common
occurrence. Bengtsson and Sensoy also study renegotiation of venture capital rights, which
they define to include later venture capitalists taking senior cash-flow rights over existing
investors. They in fact find that renegotiation of existing venture capitalists' rights is very
rare. Ola Bengtsson & Berk A. Sensoy, Changing the Nexus: The Evolution and Renegotiation of
Venture Capital Contracts, 2-3, 11, 30 (Ohio St. U., Fisher C. of Bus., Working Paper No.
2009-03-019, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1475347.
3 See, e.g., Luis Villalobos, Valuation Divergence, ENTREPRENEURSHIP.ORG, http://www.
entrepreneurship.org/en/resource-center/valuation-divergence.aspx (last visited July 11,
2013).
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Over time, other talented individuals often join a start-up's man-
agement team and fill key technical positions. In some cases, they
replace founders. These individuals' interests are typically similar to
those of the founders; they are willing to take very big risks for the
possibility of reaping very large returns. Rather than differentiate be-
tween founders on the one hand and key managers and technical em-
ployees who join later on the other, we will refer to all as the
"management team" and, despite potential differences, treat their in-
terests as alike.
Angel Investors. Angel investors, as we use the term here, are
wealthy individuals4 who invest because they are intrinsically inter-
ested in the business and technology of a start-up, and because they
believe that they can pick companies that have the potential to pro-
vide a very high return on their investment over a long term.5 Angels
realize they are taking extremely high risks on a remote possibility of a
high return. They are commonly well-known and respected members
of the start-up community who make many investments and interact
repeatedly with entrepreneurs, other angel investors, and venture
capitalists.
Venture Capital Funds. Venture capital funds are limited partner-
ships with a term of roughly ten years. Their investors are institutions
and wealthy individuals who are passive with respect to the manage-
ment of the fund. A venture capital firm, run by a group of partners
or the equivalent, manages the fund. The venture capital firm's com-
pensation is determined by two factors: the profitability of the fund
and the size of the fund.6
Venture capital firms ultimately have a strong interest in showing
high returns for their funds over time. This general interest, however,
does not mean that venture capitalists representing a fund on the
board of a portfolio company or in voting the fund's shares will want
to maximize the value of the portfolio company at each moment in
time. Rather, there are situations in which venture capital firms have
overriding interests. Venture capital firms continually raise new funds
while at the same time investing a current fund in a portfolio of
start-ups, liquidating those investments, and distributing the proceeds
to a fund's investors. As the term of one fund ends, another fund has
already begun making investments. Demonstrable success in a cur-
4 There are also funds that describe themselves as angel-investment funds. We treat
them as early-stage venture capital funds.
5 See Colleen Debaise, What's an Angel Investor?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2010, 11:39
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 7 0230349 1 304575188420191459904.
html.
6 For a thorough explanation of the mechanics of venture capital funds, see gener-
ally William A. Sahiman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J.
FIN. EcoN. 473 (1990).
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rent fund is therefore essential for the venture capital firm to raise a
new fund.7 Consequently, at key moments when a venture capital
firm is raising a new fund, the firm may want to show results by selling
a portfolio company early at the expense of long-term value. Or, in
order to avoid disclosing the value of a portfolio company, the venture
capital firm may want to delay selling a firm that should be sold.8
Typically, venture capital firms specialize in investing at a particu-
lar stage in the lifecycle of a start-up. Firms' interests differ depend-
ing on the stage at which they invest.9 Again, simplifying somewhat,
we divide venture capital funds into three categories.
Early-stage (or "Series A") funds are similar to angel investors.
They invest at the earliest stages of a start-up's lifecycle. An early-stage
fund faces high risk and seeks high returns. The companies in which
the fund invests are young and unproven, and initial investment valua-
tions are low.10 Relatively few of these funds' portfolio companies will
survive, but those that do can provide very high returns. As a result, if
a portfolio company has increased substantially in value on the fund's
books, depending on how other firms in the fund's portfolio are do-
ing, the fund may become quite conservative and try to preserve the
value of the firm for a successful exit. Such an early-stage investor may
resist the company's efforts to take risks-even if the potential upside
is high-and may favor an early sale rather than holding out for a
higher price later.
Mid-stage (or "Series B" and "Series C") funds invest in firms with
operating histories and perhaps even revenues." Valuations for mid-
7 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of
the Corporation, 54 UCILA L. REv. 37, 72 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capi-
tal Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1090 (2003); Hatim
Tyabji & Vijay Sathe, Venture Capital Firms in America: Their Caste System and Other Secrets, IvEY
Bus. J., July/Aug. 2010, available at http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/the-organ
ization/venture-capital-firms-in-america-their-caste-system-and-other-secrets#.ULQwboc83
To.
8 Bartlett, supra note 7, at 73-74. Venture capital firms typically provide limited part-
ners with annual reports on the fund's results. See Sahlman, supra note 6, at 492. These
reports contain key pieces of information about portfolio investments, including the cur-
rent valuation of each investment (with information regarding whether or not the invest-
ment has gone up or down since the investment was made), the current status of the board
and executive officers, and other information about the success or failure of the invest-
ment. In some funds, these reports are more frequent (quarterly or even monthly). A
limited partner of the fund can get a good idea from these reports of how well the venture
fund is doing. In effect, the reports serve a dual role of providing information to current
investors and promoting the next fund to current and potential investors.
9 Early investors may invest alongside new investors in later rounds of financing as
well, but these investments tend to be small and we ignore them here. Robert Bartlett has
written generally about conflicting interests among venture capitalists. See Bartlett, supra
note 7.
10 See Sahiman, supra note 6, at 479 tbl.2 ("Startup investments usually go to compa-
nies that are less than one year old.").
II See id.
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stage venture capital investments are higher and risk is lower than val-
uations and risk for early-stage investments. The limited partners of
mid-stage funds, and thus their funds, tend to be less tolerant of losses
than are early-stage funds, but they do take large risks. Mid-stage
funds can be risk averse, however, when they are raising a new fund.
Later-stage ("Series D" and later) funds are less risk tolerant than
mid-stage funds. Later-stage funds typically invest in companies where
they see a sale or IPO as likely within a few years, and they expect
returns of two to five times their investment. 12 In order for their
investment model to work, they need to avoid total failure on most, if
not all, of their investments.
In sum, funds that specialize in investing at different stages of a
start-up's lifecycle accept different risk-return profiles for their invest-
ments. Those differences translate into different preferences for liq-
uidation rights. Most importantly, later investors tend to seek more
certain returns and may try to use expansive13 liquidation rights to
achieve that objective. These differences are reflected in investors'
preferences regarding exit as well.
II
LIQUIDATION RIGHTS
The capital structure of a start-up consists of common and pre-
ferred stock. The management team and employees hold common
stock, and investors hold preferred stock that is convertible into com-
mon stock. The preferred stock provides for liquidation rights, which
determine the allocation of proceeds among investors and the man-
agement team and employees if the company is either sold or liqui-
dated.14 Because a sale is the most common exit for investors, 15 these
rights are an important determinant of the returns on an investment
and on the efforts of the management team and employees. Liquida-
tion rights can have a detrimental effect on the incentives of the man-
agement team and employees, and they can create conflicting
interests among investors, resulting in a failure to maximize the firm's
value. 16
12 See id.
13 By "expansive" liquidation rights, we mean liquidation rights greater than a liquida-
tion preference equal to the amount of an investor's investment. This includes initial liqui-
dation rights greater than 1x and any participation rights.
14 In this Article, we discuss liquidation preferences only in the context of a sale.
15 Of the 522 exits of venture-backed U.S. companies in 2011, only 45 were IPOs.
Robin Wauters, Report: 522 Exits of Venture-Backed US Companies Netted $53.2 Billion in 2011,
TECHCRUNCH (an. 3, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/03/report-522-exits-of-
venture-backed-companies-netted-53-2-billion-in-2011/.
16 Preferred stock with cumulative dividends can have a similar effect. While these
provisions are sometimes found in start-ups, they are rare in technology companies, and we
do not address them here. For more information on dividends and their effects, see gener-
2013] 1403
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A. The Mechanics of Liquidation Rights
Liquidation rights can take two forms: an initial liquidation pref-
erence and participation rights. Preferred stock can carry an initial
liquidation preference alone or an initial liquidation preference plus
participation.
Initial Liquidation Preference. An initial liquidation preference pro-
vides that, in the event of a sale, the holders of preferred stock receive
a specified amount per share prior to any payments to the holders of
common stock. In some cases, a later-stage investor negotiates an ini-
tial liquidation preference that is senior to the preferences of earlier
investors. If the proceeds from a sale are less than or equal to the
aggregate amount payable under the preferred shareholders' initial
liquidation preferences, the common shareholders get nothing. If
this happens, proceeds are allocated among the preferred sharehold-
ers in proportion to their liquidation rights and not their percent
ownership.
The initial liquidation preference for a series of stock is typically,
but not always, set to equal the initial price paid for the series.' 7 For
example, if a company raises $100,000 in the sale of Series A Preferred
stock at a price per share of $1.00, each share of Series A would typi-
cally have an initial liquidation preference of $1.00. If the company is
then sold for $75,000 before any additional rounds of financing, that
entire amount would be paid to the holders of the Series A shares,
and the holders of common stock would get nothing (absent negoti-
ated revisions to the terms). On the other hand, ignoring for the mo-
ment conversion and participation rights (discussed below), if the
company were sold for $10 million, each share of Series A would be
entitled to receive $1.00 per share for an aggregate payment of
$100,000, and the common shareholders would receive the remaining
$9.9 million.
The sum of initial liquidation preferences for all investors sets the
valuation at which holders of common stock-the management team
and employees-can begin to reap a return on their efforts upon the
sale of the company. With the initial liquidation preference for each
series of preferred stock set equal to the amount invested in each se-
ries, the common will reap a return so long as the company sells for
ally Brad Feld, Term Sheet: Dividends, FELDTHOUGHTS (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.feld.
com/wp/archives/2005/03/term-sheet-dividends.html.
17 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 2 at 389 (observing liquidation preferences
greater than initial investment in twenty-two out of seventy-eight post-first-round financ-
ings); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 982 (2006) (noting that liquidation preferences can far exceed inves-
tors' original purchase price of shares); Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 2, at 288, 290
(noting that more than ninety-eight percent of financings sampled had an initial liquida-
tion preference of at least the amount invested).
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an amount above the aggregate amount of cash that investors have
put into it. Initial liquidation preferences can thus create an incentive
for the management team to add value to the company. A higher
initial liquidation preference of, say, two times an investor's invest-
ment drives up the point at which the management team and employ-
ees will share the proceeds of a sale. This too may create sufficient
incentives, but as discussed below, if the possibility of a payoff for the
management team and employees is too remote, their incentives to
build the company will be low.18
Participation Rights. Once all preferred stockholders' initial liqui-
dation preferences are fulfilled, the preferred shareholders' participa-
tion and conversion rights determine the allocation of the remaining
proceeds of a sale.19 Participation rights allow a preferred share-
holder to share the proceeds of a sale on a pro rata basis with the
common shareholders as though the preferred shares are common
shares. Such rights, when uncapped, are referred to as "fully partici-
pating preferred stock." Often, the sum of initial liquidation prefer-
ences and participation rights is capped at between two and five times
the initial price of the preferred share,20 in which case the shares are
referred to as "participating preferred stock with a x-times cap"-or,
for example, a "4x" cap. In some cases, preferred shares are "nonpar-
ticipating,"21 meaning that the only liquidation rights are the initial
18 See Brad Feld, Term Sheet: Liquidation Preference, FELDTHOUGHTS (Jan. 4, 2005),
http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2005/01/term-sheet-liquidation-preference.html
("There's a fine balance here and each case is situation specific, but a rational investor will
want a combination of 'the best price' while insuring 'maximum motivation' of manage-
ment and employees."); see also infra Part II.B.
19 See generally Timothy J. Harris, Modeling the Conversion Decisions of Preferred Stock, 58
Bus. LAW. 587, 589-90 (2003) (discussing the various types of participation rights available
with preferred stock).
20 See, e.g., Duncan Davidson, Venture 101: Participating Preferred, BULLPEN CAPITAL
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://bullpencap.com/2011/04/06/venture-101-participating-preferred/.
In Bengtsson and Sensoy's sample, forty-six percent of financings included participation
rights with no cap, and twenty-three percent included participation rights with a cap. See
Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 29.
21 An example of a "Fully Participating Preferred" provision:
Remaining Assets. Upon the completion of the distribution required by Section x above, the remaining
assets of the Corporation available for distribution to stockholders shall be distributed among the hold-
ers of Series A Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Common Stock pro rata based on the
number of shares of Common Stock held by each (assuming conversion of all such Preferred Stock into
Common Stock).
An example of a "Participating Preferred with an x times cap" provision:
Remaining Assets. Upon the completion of the distribution required by Section x above, the remaining
assets of the Corporation available for distribution to stockholders shall be distributed among the hold-
ers of Series A Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Common Stock pro rata based on the
number of shares of Common Stock held by each (assuming conversion of all such Preferred Stock into
Common Stock) until the holders shall have received an aggregate of $[x times initial purchase price]
per share (as adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends, reclassification and the like) of Series A Pre-
ferred Stock and $[x times initial purchase price] per share (as adjusted for stock splits, stock divi-
dends, reclassification and the like) of Series B Preferred Stock then held by them (including amounts
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liquidation preference. More often than not, liquidation rights nego-
tiated at the earliest stages of a company's lifecycle tend to be
nonparticipating preferred.22 However, a substantial number of
preferred-stock financings at the first and second investment rounds
include participation rights. Later financing rounds at higher valua-
tions tend to have more expansive participation rights than earlier
rounds. 23
If an investor's initial liquidation preference and participation
rights offer a smaller share of a company's sale proceeds than would
the same number of shares of common stock, the preferred share-
holders will exercise their right to convert to common stock, sharing
the proceeds of sale pro rata with the common stockholders.
Whether conversion offers holders of preferred stock a larger portion
of the proceeds will depend on the sale price, the size of the liquida-
tion preference that the preferred shares provide, and whether the
preferred shares carry participation rights. For example, if the pre-
ferred shares do not provide for participation rights and the company
is sold for an amount far greater than the aggregate initial liquidation
preferences, the preferred shareholder would convert to common. At
the other extreme, if the company is sold for an amount equal to or
lower than the aggregate initial liquidation preferences, the preferred
shareholder will not convert and will instead collect whatever amount
is payable under its initial liquidation preference (while the common
shareholders get nothing). Figure 1 illustrates the interplay of initial
liquidation preferences, participation, and caps on participation for a
company that has only a single series of preferred shares outstanding.
We explain below the complications that arise when new investors
with different liquidation rights enter the picture.
paid pursuant to Section X above); thereafter, if assets remain in the Corporation, the holders of the
Common Stock of the Corporation shall receive all of the remaining assets of the Corporation pro rata
based on the number of shares of Common Stock held by each.
An example of a "Nonparticipating Preferred" provision:
Remaining Assets. Upon the completion of the distribution required by Section x above, if assets re-
main in the Corporation, the holders of the Common Stock of the Corporation shall receive all of the
remaining assets of the Corporation.
22 See David Young, Answer to Is It Common for Angel Investors to Get Participating Pre-
ferred Stock?, Quoim, http://www.quora.com/Is-it-common-for-angel-investors-to-get-partici-
pating-preferred-stock (last visited July 11, 2013).
23 See From the WSGR Database: Financing Trends for 2012, THE ENTREPRENEURs REPORT:
PRivATE COMPANY FINANCING TRENDS (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, Cal.),
Q3 2012, at 1, 2-3, http://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/EntrepreneursReport-
Q3-2012.pdf (reporting that in 2012, the proportion of deals including participation rights
increased in later rounds and attributing this to increasing valuations); Bengtsson & Sen-
soy, supra note 2, at 32 (finding that participation rights became stronger in subsequent
rounds eight percent of the time and weaker nine percent of the time).
1406 [Vol. 98:1399
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FIGURE 1. DIsTIUTIoN OF SALE PROCEEDS WITH A SINGLE INVESTOR
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In Figure la, the company has sold 100,000 shares of Series A
Preferred at a price of $1.00 per share and a premoney valuation of
$400,000, meaning that there will be 400,000 shares of common stock
after the investment. The Series A shares are fully participating and
have an initial liquidation preference of $1.00 per share. The dashed
black line shows the payoff to the preferred shareholders, and the
solid grey line the payoff to the common as the sale price increases.
With a liquidation preference and full participation, the payoff to the
preferred is always above that of the common, so the preferred share-
holders will never convert, regardless of the amount for which the
company is sold.
Figure lb adds a 3x cap on the liquidation rights of the preferred,
which includes the sum of the initial liquidation preference and par-
ticipation. With the cap, any sale at or above $1.1 million will yield a
payoff to the preferred shareholders of $3.00 per share (three times
the initial investment of $1.00 per share) for an aggregate of
$300,000. For a sale price above $1.5 million, the common sharehold-
ers will receive more than $3.00 per share. Consequently, if the com-
pany sells for over $1.5 million, the preferred shareholders will
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
convert to common stock. For sales between $1.1 million and $1.5
million, the payoff to the preferred is constant at $300,000.24
Figure Ic shows nonparticipating preferred shares. Here, the
preferred shareholders have only the initial liquidation preference of
$1.00 per share. The result is that the proceeds of sale for the pre-
ferred shareholders are greater than the proceeds for the common
shareholders in sales under $500,000. For sales over $500,000, the
payment on the common shares will exceed that of the preferred, so
the preferred shareholders will convert to common.
B. Incentives Created by Liquidation Rights
The examples above, though simple, begin to illustrate how liqui-
dation rights can result in divergent interests between the manage-
ment team and investors. In each of the examples, a sale at $100,000
will result in all proceeds going to investors and nothing going to the
management team or employees. Although a sale at this level would
not be a win for the investors-at $100,000, they just get back their
initial investment-it could be their best alternative, or as discussed in
Part I, they may have other reasons to sell the company early rather
than taking a risk on a later sale at a higher price. The management
team, however, has no incentive to cooperate in such a sale unless the
investors or the acquirer provides an additional inducement.
In Figure la, where the preferred shareholders have full partici-
pation rights, preferred and common shareholders have the same in-
terests in selling the company for the highest price they can get above
$100,000. Unless a sale price substantially above $100,000 is a reason-
able possibility, however, the management team and employees could
have limited enthusiasm for working hard to build the company in
this scenario.2 5 But for sales at prices over $100,000, liquidation rights
do not create divergent interests.
24 In a sale for $1.1 million, the Series A shareholders will get their initial liquidation
preference of $100,000 plus 20% of the proceeds above that, which comes to $200,000.
Accordingly, their share of the proceeds comes to $300,000, which is $3.00 per share for
their 100,000 shares. At sales for more than $1.1 million, the Series A shareholders get
nothing more. They are capped at $3.00 per share. So for sales between $1.1 million and
$1.5 million, the common shareholders will get 80% of proceeds between $100,000 (the
Series A liquidation preference) and $1.1 million (with the preferred getting 20% of pro-
ceeds in that range) plus all proceeds above $1.1 million. (There is a slight change in the
slope of the payment curve at $1.1 million for the common.) At $1.5 million that comes to
$800,000 plus $400,000 for a total of $1.2 million or $3.00 per share for each of the 400,000
common shares. Consequently, for sales above $1.5 million, the Series A shareholders will
convert their shares to common shares.
25 See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REv. 315,
347-48 (2005) (discussing the role of liquidation rights in venture capital financings and
the associated incentives).
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Figure lb, where participation rights are capped, shows another
way in which liquidation rights can create misaligned incentives be-
tween investors and the management team. Here, there is a range of
valuations-between $1.1 million and $1.5 million-in which the pro-
ceeds to the investors will not increase but the proceeds to the com-
mon shareholders will. In this range, the holders of the common
shares will want to seek a higher price, but the holders of preferred
will have no incentive to do so. If there is a reasonable possibility of
selling the company at a higher price after building it further for, say,
one more year, the common shareholders may want to take the gam-
ble while the investors will want to sell immediately. 26
In Figure Ic, which illustrates nonparticipating preferred shares,
there is also a range in which the management team has an interest in
seeking a higher price but the preferred shareholders do not. Here,
the range is toward the lower end of valuations, from $100,000 to
$500,000. Above $500,000, both the management team and investors
alike will want to build the company.
These examples, all of which involve a single investor, show how
the interests of an investor and the management team can diverge.
The divergence of interests becomes more complex when the com-
pany issues a new series of preferred stock to new investors as it grows
and its valuation increases. Each investor invests a different amount at
a different valuation and has different objectives for its investment.
The result is not only divergent interests between the management
team and investors but divergent interests among investors as well.
We set out below a hypothetical case of a late-stage start-up with
four rounds of financing. For simplicity, we assume there is a single
investor in each round and that each investor invests only in a single
round. We later discuss complications that arise if investors invest in
multiple rounds. 27 The terms of each financing round are as follows:
Series A Financing
* The company raises $100,000, selling 1,000,000 shares of Se-
ries A Preferred at a price of $0.10 per share with a premoney
valuation of $400,000.
* The company negotiates an initial preference of $0.10 per
share and participation rights with a three-times ($0.30-per-
share) cap.
26 As Fried and Ganor explain, at certain valuations, the investor's interest is debt-like.
Accordingly, an investor may favor a sale that is not value maximizing, while the manage-
ment team and employees, who have common stock, favor remaining independent. Fried
& Ganor, supra note 17, at 994.
27 See infra Part III.C.L.
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Series B Financing
* The company has progressed nicely since the Series A and can
now command a higher valuation. Everything is going well,
but it isn't quite as easy to convince the venture capitalists to
invest without a higher participation cap.
* The company now raises $1,000,000, selling 1,250,000 shares
of Series B Preferred at a price of $0.80 per share with a
premoney valuation of $4,000,000.
* The company negotiates an initial preference of $0.80 per
share with a five-times ($4.00-per-share) cap.
Series C Financing
* The company has now experienced a tenfold increase in
value. The Series C terms mirror the Series B terms.
* The company raises $15,000,000, selling 2,340,000 shares of
Series C Preferred at a price of $6.40 per share with a
premoney valuation of $40,000,000.
* The company negotiates an initial preference of $6.40 per
share with a five-times ($32.00-per-share) cap.
Series D Financing
* When it comes time to do the Series D financing, the com-
pany's financial model is under pressure. The company is
clearly successful-a reasonable valuation shows a fifty per-
cent increase since the Series C round. But the company's
success has increased its burn rate as each new hire arrives,
and it needs to raise more than it has before-more than
twice the cumulative investment so far.
* The company raises $35,000,000, selling 5,000,000 shares of
Series D Preferred at a price of $7.00 per share with a
premoney valuation of $60,000,000.
* Being a late-stage investor and preferring more certain re-
turns, the Series D investor negotiates an initial preference of
two times its initial investment at $14.00 per share and full
participation. Furthermore, its initial liquidation preference
will be paid prior to the preferences payable on the earlier
series of preferred shares.
The liquidation rights in this example are somewhat extreme for pur-
poses of illustration, but they are well within the realm of possibility.
Figure 2 plots the payoffs to each series of preferred and com-
mon stock as the potential sale price increases. The graph on the top
provides a closer look at payoffs at valuations of up to $200 million,
and the graph on the bottom shows payoffs at valuations of up to $600
million.
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FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF SALE PROCEEDS WITH MULTIPLE SERIES OF
PREFERRED SHARES
$50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000
liquidation Value (in $,000s)
$0 $150,000 $300,000 $450,000 $600,000
liquidation Value (in $,000s)
< - Common
--- Series C Preferred
***** Series A Preferred - - Series B Preferred
- Series D Preferred
As these figures show, the interests of the management team and
the investors radically diverge from one another at different valua-
tions. Focusing first on the management team, which holds common
stock (in solid grey lines), they and their employees will not get any
payoff unless the company sells for approximately $86 million or
more. Their first dollar begins to accrue at that point, and from that
point on, they share essentially pan passu with the preferred share-
holders. 2 8 Regardless of the risk, their financial incentive is to resist a
sale at any valuation close to $86 million and to take risks in the hope
of realizing a better outcome in the future.
28 Their share increases slightly when the caps on the Series B and C participation
take effect.
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Among the four series of preferred shares, Series D gets all the
proceeds in any sale up to $70 million, receiving twice its investment.
This is the result of the priority that the Series D investor negotiated.
The other investors will not get a penny unless the company is sold for
over $70 million. At that point, the other preferred shareholders' liq-
uidation preferences are triggered and consume all of the proceeds of
sales up to a valuation of approximately $86.1 million. These liquida-
tion preferences are paid pro rata based on their size, so the Series C
investor gets a much higher portion than does the Series A or B inves-
tor in this range of valuations.29 One would thus expect serious disa-
greement among the investors regarding a sale for up to $86.1 million
or more. A similar level of disagreement would occur at valuations of
about $420 million and $486 million, where the cap on the Series C
shares' participation takes effect and renders the Series C investor in-
different to sales within that range. Above $486 million, the Series C
investor will convert to common shares and share pan passu in sales
above that level. For sales above that level, there will be no
disagreement.
To make this more concrete, the payoffs for a sale at $75 million
are as follows:
* Common Stock: Zero
* Series A Preferred: $31,000
* Series B Preferred: $311,000
* Series C Preferred: $4.65 million
* Series D Preferred: $70 million
Assume that if the company is not sold now for $75 million, it has
a reasonable but uncertain possibility of being acquired a year later at
$100 million, but there is also the possibility that the company will
slide downhill in the next year.3 0 The division of $100 million in pro-
ceeds would be as follows:
* Common Stock: $4.1 million
* Series A Preferred: $1 million
* Series B Preferred: $2.3 million
* Series C Preferred: $17.4 million
29 Series A's liquidation preference of 300 per share, totaling $100,000, and its partici-
pation are not visible on the graph. The Series A investor's share of sale proceeds is essen-
tially the same as that of the common stock. It converts to common at a sale price of $90.1
million. Series B has a liquidation preference of 80V and then participates up to its 5x cap
and converts to common at a valuation of $139.4 million.
30 There is no need to add detail to this set of hypotheticals, but one could set this up,
for example, as a 95% probability of selling the company for $100 million and a 5%
probability of it being worth zero. In this case, the Series D investor would be slightly
better off than in a sale at $75 million, but because of other factors, including risk aversion
of the individuals making the decision for the fund, that investor may prefer an immediate
sale. Alternatively, if the Series D investor places a 90% probability on a sale at $100 mil-
lion, then the expected value of an immediate sale at $75 million is better for it.
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* Series D Preferred: $75.2 million
Whereas the Series D investor does only slightly better by holding
out for a $100 million sale, the differences in returns for the other
investors are substantial. As explained in Part I, the late-stage Series D
investor is relatively risk averse. Its 2x senior liquidation preference
reflects and reinforces this risk aversion by providing the Series D in-
vestor with the first claim to proceeds from a sale but then providing it
with no more until the other investors receive their initial liquidation
preferences. As a result, the Series D investor's return on a sale at
$100 million is only slightly higher than its return on a sale at $75
million. Depending on the probabilities it places on a sale at $100
million and depending on other the other factors discussed in Part I,
the Series D would probably prefer a definite sale at $75 million over
an uncertain possibility of a sale at $100 million later on.
In contrast, the Series A investor would receive a thirtyfold
greater return by holding out for a sale at $100 million. At $75 mil-
lion it would lose two thirds of its investment, but at $100 million it
would reap a 1Ox return on its investment. This is below the target
return for the most successful investments in its high-risk portfolio,
but it is an attractive outcome nonetheless. The early-stage investor
with Series A shares would clearly oppose a sale at $75 million-put-
ting it at odds with the Series D-but it could well favor a sale at $100
million.
The Series B investor, like the Series A investor, takes a loss at
$75 million and would prefer holding out for a sale at a higher valua-
tion. But it is unclear whether the Series B investor would go along
with the Series A investor in favoring a sale at $100 million if a sale at a
yet higher price in the future is in the cards. The Series B investor
would more than double its investment in a sale at $100 million, but
such a return falls substantially below its expectations and those of its
investors for a successful portfolio company.
The Series C investor would roughly quadruple its proceeds in a
sale at $100 million compared to a sale at $75 million. Still, the Series
C investor might want to hold out for an even higher sale price in the
future, depending both on its assessment of the risk and return and
on the factors discussed in Part I.
For the management team, a sale at $100 million gets them some-
thing rather than nothing, but at this stage in the company's develop-
ment, a $4 million payoff to the common stockholders will not be
attractive to them. By the fourth round of financing, the outstanding
common stock is likely to be widely held among employees and ex-
employees, so the management team will receive only a fraction of the
$4 million. Consequently, the management team will likely resist a
sale and would be willing to bet the company on a much better out-
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come down the road. Even with a sale at $200 million, the manage-
ment team does not do all that well, considering its ambitions from
the start, and it might have an incentive to take extreme risks for the
remote possibility of a greater reward.
If the company were sold for $200 million, the proceeds would be
divided as follows:
* Common Stock = $33.8 million
* Series A Preferred = $8.5 million
* Series B Preferred = $10.6 million
* Series C Preferred = $34.8 million
* Series D Preferred = $112.4 million
A $33.8 million payoff to the common shareholders may be an attrac-
tive outcome for the management team, depending on how widely
held the shares are. But perhaps not.
These examples illustrate two problems. First, if the company is
sold, liquidation rights slice up the proceeds of a sale among investors
in ways that produce conflicting interests. We discuss below how these
interests translate into action, but it is clear from what we have shown
that the cash flows created by liquidation rights like the ones in this
example provide no assurance that investors and management consid-
ering a sale of the company will make a value-maximizing decision.
Second, the accumulation of liquidation rights can result in the
management team and employees reaping too small a share of the
proceeds if the company is sold. This can result in incentives that run
counter to the investors' interests and that are inconsistent with maxi-
mizing firm value. One danger is that the management team and its
employees, foreseeing such a prospect, will have insufficient incentive
to remain with the company and to continue working hard to maxi-
mize its value. In the example above, if a sale at $100 million-for a
return on aggregate invested capital of roughly 100%-is the best
foreseeable outcome, the prospect of a $4.1 million payoff to common
shareholders is unlikely to be enough to keep the management team
and employees with the company.
Alternatively, rather than leaving the company, which could im-
pair an entrepreneur's reputation, the management team may instead
bet the company on a low-likelihood strategy for a "home run." Or it
may resist efforts to sell the company and instead direct the company
toward an IPO. The terms of preferred stock provide that the shares
will automatically convert to common if the company goes public. 31
As a result, liquidation rights will become irrelevant, and each party's
interest in the post-IPO company will be determined by its percent
31 See Smith, supra note 25, at 354. Although the preferred shareholders generally
have the right to veto a low-value IPO, they generally cannot prevent moderate-value IPOs
from occurring even if sale opportunities are present.
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ownership of common stock on an as-converted basis. For example, if
the company were to go public at a valuation of $100 million, the
value of each class of stock would be as follows:
* Common Stock = $29.4 million
* Series A Preferred = $7.3 million
* Series B Preferred = $9.1 million
* Series C Preferred = $17.2 million
* Series D Preferred = $36.8 million
The management team is thus far better off with an IPO than a sale at
$100 million.
There are a number of ways in which the management team can
prevent a sale. Most directly, if an acquirer would need members of
the management team to stay with the company following an acquisi-
tion, the team could simply make it clear that they will not do so.
Even if members of the management team are less essential, they can
decline to meet with potential acquirers or drag their feet with respect
to due diligence. The management team could also enter into con-
tracts with parties that compete with one another, thereby making it
difficult for any party to acquire the company, or it could enter into
other sorts of long-term contracts that would be unattractive to
acquirers.
There is empirical support for the proposition that, in a substan-
tial number of cases, suboptimal liquidation rights accumulate as we
have illustrated in this example and that there are impediments to
renegotiating all liquidation rights when this has occurred. Studies
have shown that liquidation rights increase as financing rounds con-
tinue and that earlier liquidation rights are infrequently
renegotiated.32
C. Governing with Conflicting Interests
Conflicting interests and incentives affect firm value only if they
translate into action or inaction. So the next question is whether the
potentially conflicting interests created by liquidation rights actually
result in premature sales, avoidance of sales, excessive risk taking, and
the failure of start-ups that could have been sold. These are empirical
questions that warrant further investigation, but they would be diffi-
cult to answer systematically with data. A premature sale would be
nearly impossible to identify, data on risk taking by private companies
would be difficult to collect and more difficult to analyze, and sales
avoided would pose similar challenges-especially if the result is fail-
32 Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 30, 32; Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at
389, 391 (reporting that thirteen out of seventy-eight post-first-round financings had
renegotiations).
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ure. 3 We therefore rely on the limited data available and on the
experience of one of us as a basis for making some generalizations.
From an a priori perspective, the accumulation of liquidation
rights raises doubt as to whether a decision to sell the company will be
a value-maximizing decision. Because liquidation rights subject differ-
ent parties to different marginal payoffs, it would not be surprising to
find that they induce sale decisions based on one or more of the par-
ties' payoff functions rather than on collective shareholder welfare.
Whether a company with expansive liquidation rights is sold-
and if it is, at what price-will depend on a number of factors. These
include the range of valuations that potential acquirers are willing to
pay, expectations regarding sale options in the future, the importance
of management-team cooperation in selling the company, whether
potential acquirers need the management team to stay with the com-
pany, whether investors are motivated to sell by factors other than
their return on this investment, which investors control the board and
the payoff available to those investors, 34 and whether investors are will-
ing to sell (and a buyer is willing to buy) the company without high
levels of support from other investors and the management team.
Often, a company can be sold only if there is a consensus among
investors, and the management team's agreement may be necessary as
well.3 5 Although boards act by majority vote, as a practical matter,
sales commonly require the unanimous support of the board.3 6 This
is true for three reasons. First, in the typical acquisition of a start-up,
the acquiring company will require, as a closing condition in the ac-
quisition agreement, that the board of directors of the company unan-
imously approve the acquisition. The company's board will typically
be comprised of venture capitalists whose funds have invested in the
company, the CEO and perhaps another member of the management
33 Broughman and Fried addressed this challenge by conducting surveys and inter-
views with entrepreneurs involved in fifty start-ups that were sold in 2003 and 2004. See
Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at 385, 387-88. They focused on the relatively objective
question of whether payoffs were renegotiated prior to a sale. The questions raised here,
however, would be substantially more difficult to answer with information obtained in in-
terviews. For example, how reliable would answers to the following questions be: "Your
company failed in 2011. Could you have sold it prior to its failure? What risks did you take
in choosing not to sell? Did you have in mind the possibility of an IPO? How likely was
that? At what valuation?" Even if entrepreneurs would answer these sorts of questions,
their answers would be infected by self-serving and hindsight biases.
34 See generally Smith, supra note 25, at 318-30 (investigating the relationship between
board control and venture capital exit options in venture capital-backed companies).
35 See, e.g., Robert V. Hawn, Your Company Has Just Signed an Acquisition Agreement -
Now What?, SAN JOSE Bus. LAW. BLOG (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.sanjosebusinesslawyers
blog.com/2012/08/your-company-has-just-signed-an-acquisition-agreement---now-what.
html. Bartlett discusses litigation that has occurred in the context of venture capitalists'
disputes regarding acquisitions. See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 89-95.
36 See Hawn, supra note 35.
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team, and one or more directors upon whom the investors and the
management team have agreed. Second, every board member has a
fiduciary duty to promote the interests of all shareholders, not just the
investor that, in effect, placed him or her on the board. If an investor
that opposes a sale brings a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty, the
sale can be delayed indefinitely, and damages can be awarded against
board members, the venture capital funds behind them, and the ac-
quirer. A sale will rarely go forward with even a threat of litigation.
This is one reason an acquirer makes unanimous board approval a
condition to a sale. Finally, all parties want to build and maintain rep-
utations in the start-up and venture capital communities. Forcing a
sale over the objection of an investor could put reputations at risk,
especially if the objecting investor is a prominent fund with a good
reputation. Forcing a sale over the objection of the management
team is generally less risky, but as explained above, it can be difficult
to do as a practical matter.
When expansive liquidation rights are involved, consensus does
not necessarily mean a value-maximizing decision making. It can
mean delayed sales in the hope that a company's valuation will grow
high enough for all investors to get a sufficiently attractive return pur-
suant to their liquidation rights. Companies that should be sold ear-
lier are not sold. In addition, as explained above, to the extent
investors need the management team's cooperation, liquidation rights
can lead to further delay or to no sale at all. The management team
will share in the proceeds of a sale only if the valuation is high enough
to cover all investors' liquidation preferences; even then, to the extent
that the investors have participation rights and a high percentage of
the company's shares, the amount going to the management team can
be a small percentage of the total proceeds.
Experience and empirical evidence confirm that expansive liqui-
dation rights do in fact lead to suboptimal outcomes. The empirical
evidence relates to the conflicting interests between investors and
management in sale decisions. Professors Broughman and Fried
found that when a sale is being negotiated, a separate payment to
management is sometimes negotiated.3 7 These management "carve
outs," as they are referred to in practice, are provided in order to in-
duce management to support the sale. They are not, however, a solu-
tion to the problem we describe-they are evidence of it. The side
payments that Broughman and Fried found are sometimes necessary
to induce the management team to support a sale, but they are not an
ideal arrangement to rely on. They do not promote ex ante incentives
because the management team and employees cannot anticipate in
37 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at 389-91 (finding that eleven out of fifty-one
sales involved separate payments to management).
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advance that a carve out will be forthcoming. They are also conten-
tious and difficult to negotiate in the midst of a sale. In addition, they
are taxed as ordinary income. If, instead, the management team re-
ceived a gain on their shares as a result of a sale, the gain would be
taxed as a capital gain.
III
THE CONTRACTING CHALLENGE AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The analysis above raises two questions. First, why do investors in
start-ups commonly negotiate liquidation rights that can lead to
suboptimal outcomes? Second, why is there no renegotiation of liqui-
dation rights that accumulate to a point at which the possibility of a
suboptimal outcome appears on the horizon?
A. The Dynamics of Sequential Contracting
Start-ups go through successive rounds of financing over a period
of years. Investors negotiating one round do not know what the next
round of investors will demand, nor do they know what the balance of
bargaining power will be in the next round. Bargaining power with
respect to financing can vary dramatically from one round to an-
other.38 In this setting, investors in earlier rounds may negotiate ex-
pansive liquidation rights in an effort to protect themselves from the
impact of liquidation rights that later investors negotiate. The exam-
ple in Part II in which the Series A and B shares provide participation
with 3x and 5x caps is just for illustrative purposes, but financings sim-
ilar to this occur in a significant number of cases.39 What is nearly
universal, however, is that later investors take the liquidation rights of
current investors as a floor and negotiate rights that are at least as
generous-and sometimes more generous-to themselves, just as the
Series C and D did in our example. 40
38 Cf Yrj6 Koskinen, Michael J. Rebello & Jun Wang, Private Information and Bargain-
ing Power in Venture Capital Financing, J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 2-5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=891 192
(discussing the shift in bargaining power between management and venture capital inves-
tors over the life cycle of a start-up).
39 See Smith, supra note 25, at 347-48 (reporting that 98.37% of sampled deals con-
tained a liquidation preference and 83.92% contained participating preferred liquidation
rights); Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 2, at 284-86 (reporting that 38.5% of the sample
used participating preferred liquidation rights). Kaplan and Str6mberg's data shows an
increase between rounds in the size of a venture capital liquidation claim relative to the
venture capital investment. See id. at 313.
40 Bengtsson and Sensoy find that the terms of most rounds are the same as the terms
of the prior round. Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 32; see also Brad Feld, To Partici-
pate or Not (Participating Preferences), FELDTHOUGHTS (Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.feld.com/
wp/archives/2004/08/to-participate-or-not-participating-preferences.html; The Early Stage
Investment Blog: Understanding the Liquidation Preference, FiRsT AscENT VENTU-REs, LLC (Aug.
29, 2009), http://www.firstascentventures.com/blog/?p=37. Kaplan and Str6mberg find
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Later-round liquidation rights have a detrimental effect on ear-
lier investors-an effect that is not counterbalanced by the value of
early investors' own liquidation rights. As illustrated in our example,
the amounts invested in a start-up increase substantially over the com-
pany's lifecycle.41 In our example, the Series D investor invested $35
million, compared to $1 million from the Series B and $100,000 from
the Series A. The Series D liquidation rights provide the investor with
$70 million off the top if the company is sold, in addition to a pro rata
share of the proceeds remaining after the company has satisfied all
liquidation preferences. Once the Series A, B, and C investors begin
sharing proceeds in sales above $70 million, they share in proportion
to their preferences, and the Series C investor's share dwarfs the
shares of the Series A and B. Note in Figure 2 that the liquidation
rights of the Series A and B investors are essentially the same as that of
the common shareholders. (The Series A and B investors will convert
to common shares at valuations of $90.1 million and $139.4 million,
respectively, but their payoffs at lower valuations are only slightly
above the payoffs to common shareholders.) This compression of the
payoffs to the early investors is attributable to the expansive liquida-
tion rights of the later investors combined with the size of the later
investors' investments. Even ignoring the adverse impact that liquida-
tion rights can have on the incentives of the management team and
on the coordination of investors' decision making, the Series A and B
investors would gladly give up their liquidation rights if the later-stage
investors would give up theirs.
For early investors, liquidation rights provide essentially no bene-
fit if a company is reasonably successful. And, to the extent that they
lead to a chain reaction of stacked and conflicting liquidation rights,
they can produce positive harm. So why do early- and mid-stage inves-
tors seek and obtain expansive liquidation rights? There are a few
possible answers. One is that they believe liquidation rights will pre-
serve their fair share of the sale proceeds once later investors extract
liquidation rights for themselves. This is not true for early-stage inves-
tors and is often not true for mid-stage investors, but it is a plausible
misunderstanding. A second possible answer is that investors believe
liquidation rights will be valuable if the company is not successful and
is sold relatively early for relatively little. Here, they are right: liquida-
tion rights can in fact enhance an early- or mid-stage investor's return
in this scenario. But this is not what the early- and mid-stage investors
that liquidation rights expand over successive rounds. See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note
2, at 313. Broughman and Fried also find that liquidation preferences increase. See
Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at 389.
41 See From the WSGR Database: Financing Trends for 2012, supra note 23, at 2 (summariz-
ing amounts raised in Series A, Series B, and Series C and later rounds in the third quarter
of 2012).
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are typically in business for. To the extent that they expect many
losses in their portfolios and few big gains, the creation of problems in
success scenarios in exchange for protection in scenarios of relative
failure is out of line with their business model. A third possibility is
that investors put little thought into the matter. They may just insist
on what they perceive to be, or what their lawyer tells them, is either
"market" or "pro-investor."42
Regardless of the liquidation rights given to earlier investors, it is
the accumulation of liquidation rights for large mid- and late-stage
investors that directly causes the problems discussed in Part II. The
accumulation of liquidation rights that threaten to impair the value of
the firm raises the question of why investors cannot renegotiate all
liquidation rights together in order to optimize the firm's capital
structure. At a certain point, the management team and investors can
predict the range of prices for which the company might be sold over
some relevant time horizon. They may, for example, look ahead and
foresee a sale at $100 million to $200 million in the next twelve to
eighteen months. At that point, the impact of current and future liq-
uidation rights will be clear with respect to the incentives of the man-
agement team and to the conflicting interests of the investors in
selling the company in that projected range. At that point, if the accu-
mulated liquidation rights are so large that the management team's
prospect of a payoff is too low to motivate them, or if the payoff func-
tions created by the current mix of liquidation rights for the investors
will lead to conflicting interests regarding a sale and potentially to
excessive delay, the investors and the management team can in theory
renegotiate their liquidation rights in advance. This does happen, but
it is rare.4 3 The question is, why?
The renegotiation of liquidation rights involves several investors
and the management team in a setting of great uncertainty and asym-
metric information. This is not a zero-sum negotiation since the goal
is to improve incentives for all parties involved in order to maximize
the value of the company in a sale. But the prospect of a sale, the
42 The concept of "market," to which practitioners frequently refer, is odd in the con-
text of contracting generally. What does it really mean, especially when it changes from
year to year?
43 See Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 30 (reporting that eight percent of transac-
tions involved renegotiation and reduction of earlier investors' rights and that most of
those involved only loss of antidilution protection). Broughman and Fried found that in
thirteen out of seventy-eight post-first-round financings, existing investors had their liqui-
dation rights reduced. Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at 389 tbl.1, 391 n.6. Valuations
of the acquisitions in their sample, however, were on average only slightly greater than
aggregate initial investments, presumably as a result of the proximity of their sample pe-
riod to the tech bust. Id. at 389 tbl.1. Bartlett also provides a qualitative discussion of both
the accumulation of liquidation rights and the difficulty of renegotiating them. See Bartlett,
supra note 7, at 85-90.
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price at which the company may be sold, and the impact on incentives
would be uncertain and subject to disagreement. Consequently, the
amount of potential surplus available will be uncertain and, to at least
some investors, it could feel like a zero-sum negotiation. To compli-
cate matters further, there are no principles upon which the investors
can agree to guide their negotiation. How much upside should they
provide to the management team? How should early-, mid-, and late-
stage investors share the burden of scaling back aggregate liquidation
rights in order to provide management with more upside? How
should they adjust their payouts so that their incentives are compati-
ble with one another? There are no right answers to these questions,
so the negotiation could be contentious. Add to this the fact that all
parties will be concerned about the impact that the negotiation will
have on their reputations, and one can understand that investors are
extremely reluctant to reopen deals that have already been negoti-
ated, even if reopening them holds the prospect of making all parties
better off.4 4
In sum, the source of the problem of accumulated liquidation
rights is twofold. First, earlier investors cannot accurately anticipate
the liquidation rights that later investors will negotiate. Second, as a
company proceeds through multiple rounds of financing, investors
apparently face impediments to global renegotiation of existing liqui-
dation rights.
B. A Proposed Contractual Solution
The analysis above has focused on how liquidation rights create
conflicting interests among a start-up's investors and between its inves-
tors and management team, and how those conflicts can lead to
suboptimal outcomes. This section proposes a contractual solution to
this problem. The goal is to provide the management team with
enough upside potential to keep it motivated and to reduce flat seg-
ments of the investors' payoff functions (within relevant ranges of val-
uation). Consider the share allocations in the example in Part II, but
instead of the complex liquidation rights, assume lx pan passu prefer-
ences. In this scenario, shown in Figure 3, the management team and
employees share in the proceeds of any sale over $51.1 million, the
aggregate amount invested. For sales below $51.1 million, the inves-
tors recoup their investments in proportion to the amount that they
invested.4 5 For sales above $51.1 million, the management team and
44 Other impediments such as unfavorable tax treatment may also play a role in cer-
tain situations.
45 The payoffs to the Series A shareholders are not visible on the graph. For a sale
below the total amount of cash invested, the proceeds are distributed according to the
ratio of the investors' liquidation preferences and hence their investments. Because the
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employees share proceeds with the investors, seeing a sharp increase
in their payoff initially and then a declining rate of increase as each
investor converts to common shares.
FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF SALE PROCEEDS WITH IX INITIAL
LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE
$0 $30,000 $60,000 $90,000
Liquidation Value (in $,000s)
$120,000
a-_> Common *.... Series A Preferred - - - Series B Preferred
- - - Series C Preferred - Series D Preferred
With this structure of liquidation rights, the incentives of the
management team and investors are closely aligned. The manage-
ment team has a strong incentive to add value to the company beyond
the amounts invested and to continue increasing the company's value.
In addition, unlike the scenario described above in Figure 2, at valua-
tions of approximately $95 million and higher, the management team
has no incentive to favor an IPO over a sale. Furthermore, the inves-
tors' interests are better aligned in this scenario than they are when
liquidation rights differ among investors. For sales above $95 million,
all investors will convert to common stock, so there is no divergence of
interest in that range of valuation. The only divergence occurs at low
valuations-between approximately $52 million and $95 million-
where the Series A and B investors have converted to common shares
and would prefer a sale higher in that range, while the Series C and D
Series A investor invested far less than the Series B, C, and D investors, it receives relatively
little as a result of its liquidation preference, and its participation rights on a per-share
basis are only slightly higher than the return to common shareholders.
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are indifferent. 46 The proceeds allocated to the Series C and D inves-
tors are flat until a valuation of $89 million and $95 million, respec-
tively, where each converts to common. Compared to the divergence
of interests that occurs where liquidation rights differ across investors
as in Figure 2, above, these divergences are mild, and they occur at
valuations that reflect a relatively unsuccessful company.
We propose a contractual mechanism designed to promote (but
not guarantee) the adoption of this structure. Such a contractual
mechanism would be drafted into a start-up's charter before the first
outside investment in the company. The mechanism is designed to
respond to the source of the problem: the inability of investors to co-
ordinate their liquidation rights over time. The objective of the mech-
anism is to have investors adopt liquidation rights that minimize
divergent interests among themselves and between investors and the
management team. The solution is not perfect. Because it is contrac-
tual, it requires consent as each investor negotiates the terms of its
preferred shares. Even if early investors adopt this mechanism, there
is a danger that later investors will have the bargaining power to force
them to give it up. Moreover, there will be situations in which it is
collectively optimal to amend the mechanism in order to allow a later
investor to have enhanced liquidation rights. We therefore suggest a
way to strike a balance between preventing a new investor from using
bargaining power simply to extract wealth from existing investors and
allowing investors to grant a later investor enhanced liquidation rights
in order to enhance firm value.
Our proposal is, in effect, a default rule that would be included in
a start-up's initial charter and therefore apply to the firm's future in-
vestors. As explained below, however, there is an opportunity for a
collective opt out. The proposal has three parts: first, an assurance
that all proceeds of a sale will be paid to the preferred shareholders
up to the amount of their investment (a lx liquidation preference)
before any other payments are made; second, a most favored nation
(MFN) clause applicable to liquidation rights beyond the 1x prefer-
ence; and third, a distribution of proceeds to common shareholders
so long as the sale price is greater than the amount needed to satisfy
the 1x preference for the preferred shares. This charter provision
could be amended by a supermajority of votes of the preferred and
common shareholders.
The 1x initial preference is a bow to reality in that investors will
demand it. Even if early investors do not, later investors will, and the
MFN clause described below would then apply it to all investors. For
this reason, we suggest that companies simply adopt it in their charter
46 The Series A shareholders will convert at $51.4 million and the Series B at $53.2
million.
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at the outset. Moreover, holding back any return for the common
shareholders until the investors get their capital back may well en-
hance the incentive for the management team and employees to add
value to the start-up.47
The MFN clause addresses the need to coordinate investors over
time. It would provide that any liquidation rights accorded to one
series of preferred shares would automatically be provided to all other
series of preferred shares. So, for example, regardless of the liquida-
tion rights that an early investor negotiates, that investor will get the
same rights that any later investor negotiates above the lx provided to
all investors. The early investor, therefore, will feel no pressure to
take expansive liquidation rights as protection against the unknown
demands of a future investor. Because the early investor does not take
these rights, later investors will be less inclined to ask for expansive
liquidation rights. Conversely, any liquidation rights provided to an
early investor will also be provided to later investors. Since later inves-
tors typically invest at higher valuations, this aspect of the MFN clause
would discourage early- and mid-stage investors from taking expansive
liquidation rights if they expect a higher valuation at later rounds.4 8
The MFN clause will work in the other direction as well. A later inves-
tor that demands expansive liquidation rights will in effect be "taxed"
as a result of giving the same rights to earlier investors.49 By insisting
on a liquidation right beyond its lx preference, a later investor would
provide the same right to all other investors-past and future.
The third element of our proposal is a "Common Stock Participa-
tion Right," which would apply only if the MFN clause fails to limit the
47 We cannot say, however, that the absence of a lx initial preference would necessa-
rily weaken incentives. The management team and employees would still have the upside
reward to increasing value. The initial preference simply limits their payoff in less success-
ful scenarios, which may or may not have an impact overall.
48 For example, consider the benefits to an early-stage investor of participating pre-
ferred stock with a 5x cap in a company where all future rounds have the same participa-
tion rights to the benefits. Compare this to the same early-stage investor where neither it
nor any future investor has such participation rights. If the early-stage investor invested
$200,000 at, for example, an $800,000 premoney valuation, then at all exits in excess of $5
million, the early stage investor would lose all of its participation rights because it would
receive more in proceeds by converting to common stock. At the same time, a later-stage
investor in the same company who put in $20 million at an $80 million premoney valuation
would not convert to common shares until an exit in excess of $500 million. In other
words, for exits between $5 million and $500 million, the existence of participation rights
for all investors would harm the early-stage investor because proceeds that would otherwise
have been allocated to common shareholders would go to preferred shareholders.
49 The purpose of the MFN clause is to provide a combination of assurance and deter-
rence so that investors do not adopt any liquidation rights beyond the lx preference. If it
fails and investors adopt expansive rights despite the clause, the fact that all investors have
the same rights does not mean that they will have consistent interests. Differences in the
amounts they invest and the number of shares they hold can create kinks in their payoff
functions that result in divergent interests.
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investors to 1x liquidation preferences as of the time of a sale. The
Common Stock Participation Right addresses the potentially divergent
interests among investors as a group, on the one hand, and the man-
agement team, on the other hand. The Common Stock Participation
Right will be triggered if, as a result of whatever liquidation rights
have been negotiated, a sale would result in (a) the preferred share-
holders receiving proceeds equal to their investment and (b) the com-
mon shareholders receiving less than a minimum amount of the total
sale proceeds. That minimum amount would be a percentage of what
the common shareholders would receive based on their percent own-
ership of the company (calculated as though all preferred shares are
converted to common). We will refer to this as the "Trigger Thresh-
old." It would be a negotiated amount; for illustrative purposes, we
will set it at fifty percent. If the company is sold, and according to
whatever liquidation rights the investors have negotiated, the pre-
ferred shareholders would receive an amount greater than their initial
purchase price and the common shareholders would receive less than
fifty percent of their pro rata share of the company, then the Com-
mon Stock Participation Right would take effect prior to the fulfill-
ment of the liquidation rights that the preferred have negotiated.50
Following the payment of the 1x liquidation preference to the
holders of preferred stock, the Common Stock Participation Right
would give common stockholders the right to participate with the pre-
ferred stock according to the percent ownership of each (calculated
as though all preferred are converted to common). The common
stockholders' participation right, however, would be capped. The cap
would be the same as the Trigger Threshold-fifty percent of the
common shareholders' pro rata share of the company for purposes of
this discussion. Once the cap is reached, to the extent there are re-
maining sale proceeds, those proceeds would be distributed to the
preferred shareholders according to the liquidation rights that they
negotiated.5 1 (We refer to those liquidation rights as "Later-Added
50 In other words, the Trigger Threshold compares (a) the funds that would be dis-
tributed to common shareholders after all preferred shareholders have received their pri-
ority distributions under previously negotiated liquidation rights, with (b) fifty percent of
the funds that would be payable to Common Shareholders based solely on their pro rata
ownership (assuming the conversion of preferred shares). If the amount distributed to the
common under (a) is less than the negotiated threshold in (b), then the Common Stock
Participation Right is triggered.
51 This fifty percent cap is different from, and will take effect at lower valuations, than
the fifty percent Trigger Threshold. The Trigger Threshold determines whether the com-
mon shareholders would receive fifty percent of their pro rata share of proceeds if sale
proceeds are distributed according to the Later-Added Liquidation rights. If they are not,
the Common Stock Participation Right will apply. In that case, the common shareholders
will fully participate after the preferred shareholders have received their initial preference.
They will fully participate, however, only up to the point at which they receive fifty percent
of their pro rata share. Any remaining sale proceeds go to the preferred shareholders
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Liquidation Rights" because, if they exist, they would be written into
the charter when an investment was made, which would be after this
set of provisions is adopted.) Thus, subject to the 1x preference for
the preferred shareholders and to the availability of sale proceeds, the
common shareholders will get a (soft) guaranteed return in the event
of a sale. 5 2
As discussed in Section C, below, situations may arise in which it
is necessary to amend this arrangement. Companies should make an
amendment where necessary to attract new investment that would en-
hance firm value. In order to make it difficult for new investors to
induce an amendment to these provisions that is not value maximiz-
ing, however, a consensus among current investors and the manage-
ment team should be required to amend the arrangement. We
therefore propose that the charter require the approval of a
supermajority of the preferred shares for an amendment to the MFN
clause and a supermajority of the common shares to amend the Com-
mon Stock Participation Right.
Figure 4, below, illustrates how the Common Stock Participation
Right would work if the preferred shareholders each take 2x liquida-
tion preferences with no participation and no priority among them.
We assume the same shareholdings as above. This scenario could
arise, for example, if a later investor insists on a liquidation prefer-
ence that is higher than the 1x provided for in the initial charter but
the investors do not opt out of the MFN clause. The Common Stock
Participation Right becomes important in this scenario from the per-
spective of management and employee incentives.
In Figure 4, the graph at the top illustrates the effect of the Com-
mon Stock Participation Right, and the graph at the bottom shows the
payoffs to the preferred and common shareholders in the absence of
the right. The effect of the Common Stock Participation Right is to
provide the common shareholders with proceeds beginning at a sale
at $51.1 million, as opposed to $102.2 million. They participate with
the preferred shareholders for sales of up to $130 million.53 For sales
above $130 million, the Trigger Threshold is met-the common
shareholders will receive more than half of what they would receive
based on their pro rata share ownership-and the Common Stock
according to their Later-Added Liquidation Rights. Thus, as valuations rise, the common
shareholders will hit their cap on participation, but continue participating at the fifty per-
cent capped rate, until the preferred shareholders receive the full amount they are due
under their Later-Added Liquidation Rights.
52 An example of a Common Stock Participation Right provision including these fea-
tures is given in the Appendix, infra.
53 The common stock hits its cap on participation at $102 million, so for valuations
between $102 million and $130 million, its participation rate is 14.7% (50% of the com-
mon stock's 29.4% ownership).
1426 [Vol. 98:1399
LIQUZDATION RIGHTS
FIGURE 4. EFFECT OF COMMON STOCK PARTICIPATION RIGHT -
PREFERRED SHARES WITH 2x INITIAL LIQUIDATION PREFERENCES
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Participation Right does not apply. This Figure also reflects the fact
that the Series A and Series B shareholders will convert to common
shares in order to take advantage of the Common Stock Participation
Right. The Series A shareholders convert for sales above $52.3 mil-
lion, and the Series B convert for sales above $71.7 million. In com-
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parison, if there were no Common Stock Participation Right, these
series of preferred shares would convert for sales at $104.7 million and
$110 million, respectively, as shown in the bottom graph. The most
important impact of the Common Stock Participation Right in this
scenario, and its primary rationale, is to improve the incentives of the
management team and employees by providing a payoff to common
shareholders at lower valuations. In addition, the right reduces the
extent to which interests among investors holding preferred stock di-
verge. The extent to which this will occur in general, however, de-
pends on the specific terms of the Later-Added Liquidation Rights.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the Common Stock Participa-
tion Right on the more complex liquidation rights shown in Figure 2.
This scenario, in which the participation right is superimposed on
Later-Added Liquidation Rights, will occur only if the arrangement
proposed here has been amended so that the MFN clause is not fol-
lowed but the Common Stock Participation Right remains intact. We
present it here solely to illustrate how the participation right would be
applied in the presence of differing and complex liquidation rights.
As in Figure 4, the impact of the Common Stock Participation Right is
to allow the common stock to receive proceeds of sales beginning at
$51 million, the point at which all preferred shareholders have re-
ceived their initial investment back.54 Again, the Series A and B Pre-
ferred shares will be converted to common at lower-priced sales in
order to take advantage of these rights, and a relatively small amount
comes out of the proceeds allocated to the Series C and D sharehold-
ers. As shown in Figure 5, when the complex and conflicting liquida-
tion rights of our example are present, the Common Stock
Participation Right brings the interests of the common and preferred
shareholders into greater alignment at lower valuations. Conflicting
interests among preferred investors are also reduced at lower valua-
tions, but they reappear at higher valuations, where the Series B and C
shares have flat portions of their payoff functions. It is thus not clear,
on balance, whether the Common Stock Participation Right should
54 The Series A and B Preferred shares reach their participation caps (3x and 5x) at
valuations of $53.8 million and $94.5 million, respectively. Those caps on participation
limit the Series A and B shares' pro rata participation under the terms of the Common
Stock Participation Right. The Series A and B shares convert to common at valuations of
$55.1 million and $108.7 million, respectively. For Series B, this is evident in the flat por-
tion of the Series B payout function. It is not visible for the Series A. The additional
proceeds going to the Series A and B shareholders as a result of their conversion come out
of the proceeds that would go to the Series C and D shareholders were it not for the
Common Stock Participation Right. This is reflected in a slight decline in the slope of the
Series C and D payoff functions at the points at which the Series A and B convert. The
Trigger Threshold is $170 million, and the common stock hits its cap on participation at a
valuation of $102 million, which means that the slope of its payoff function drops from its
full pro rata ownership percentage to 50% of the ownership percentage.
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remain in place if the MFN clause is amended and expansive liquida-
tion rights are negotiated. This will depend on the specific terms of
the liquidation rights provided and the range of valuations at which a
sale is foreseen.
FIGURE 5. EFFECT OF COMMON STOCK PARTICIPATION
RIGHT WITHOUT MFN
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C. Qualifications and Limitations
There remain two issues to address. First, why is this contractual
arrangement an improvement on the status quo? Second, why is the
Common Stock Participation Right not targeted more narrowly to-
ward the management team?
1. Changing the Contracting Environment
As stated above, this proposal is, in effect, a default arrangement
established in a start-up's charter before the company seeks outside
financing.55 Liquidation rights would remain a matter of contract,
but the contracting environment would change so that there is a
thumb on the scale of consistency among investors' liquidation rights
and the promise of a return to the management team if they add
value. The contract can be amended, however, and should be under
some circumstances.
This default arrangement is an improvement over the status quo,
in which situations can arise where accumulated liquidation rights be-
come suboptimal but the parties are unable to renegotiate them effec-
tively. The lx liquidation preference and the MFN clause that we
propose are consistent with what already occurs in the majority of ven-
ture capital financings. Studies of venture capital financings report
that most liquidation preferences equal the amount initially in-
vested.56 In addition, in the majority of firms, liquidation rights pro-
vided for in later financing rounds are the same as those in early
rounds.57 Thus, these elements of our proposal are majoritarian de-
faults. Studies also show, however, that there is substantial deviation
from the majority pattern. Our proposal is targeted at those
exceptions.
The Common Stock Participation Right is a new concept, but it
performs the same function as a management carve-out, and it avoids
the disadvantages of a management carve-out explained above.58 It is,
in effect, a standby management carve-out that allows the parties to
avoid last minute negotiation in the heat of an impending sale and
that provides great tax efficiency as well. The fact that management
carve outs are used and the Common Stock Participation Right that
we propose is not used suggests either that our proposal is inferior or
55 Just to be clear regarding vocabulary, we are not proposing a default rule in the
sense that term is typically used-we are suggesting no change in the law. By "default," we
simply mean that an early charter term will set the initial ground rules, subject to later
amendment (or, to continue the analogy, opting out).
56 Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 29; Broughman & Fried, supra note 2, at 389.
57 Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 32.
58 See supra Part II.C. In addition, if the amount allocated to management under a
Common Stock Participation Right is insufficient in a particular case, then there is nothing
to stop the parties from adding a management carve out as well.
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that there have been impediments to adopting it. In our view, the
latter is the case. The right is designed to provide incentives for man-
agement in future scenarios in which the company is sold for a price
that is low relative to aggregate liquidation rights. When a start-up is
seeking early rounds of financing, if the management team were to
propose this right, it could be seen as a signal of a lack of confidence
in the company's success.59 This is especially true initially, when the
Common Stock Participation Right is unfamiliar. Start-up financings,
like many transactions, follow a pattern that is familiar to lawyers and
businesspeople involved in the business. Proposing a new, complex
liquidation right would certainly meet resistance and limit the num-
ber of investors willing to invest in the company. If, however, the right
were championed by respected venture capitalists or lawyers specializ-
ing in start-up financings-and we are correct that it has the potential
to enhance firm value-this resistance could be overcome. In our
view, therefore, the fact that this arrangement has not been developed
already is not evidence of its lack of value.
There will be situations in which our proposed arrangement
should be overridden in order to enhance firm value. We expect that
in these situations, investors and the management team will have no
difficulty amending it. The primary situation in which efficiency
would require amendment is one in which the company's perform-
ance has declined and the company needs outside financing. In that
situation, current investors' liquidation rights may be underwater, in
which case new investors would effectively subsidize existing investors.
This is analogous to a debt overhang situation.60 The optimal re-
sponse to this situation would be for investors to give an outside inves-
tor senior liquidation rights or to scale back their own rights. It may
also be optimal for the common shareholders to give up a portion of
the Common Stock Participation Right as well in order to bring in
new financing. Either concession would require amending the char-
ter, but under these circumstances, the consensus needed should be
present. The company is in trouble, and without new investment, it is
in danger of failing.
This proposal is not perfect, however. A late-stage investor might
exert bargaining power to extract expansive liquidation rights, an ex-
ception to the MFN, and perhaps even an exception to the Common
Stock Participation Right. It is also possible that a less-than-unani-
mous consensus will form among existing investors at the expense of
59 Later on, after the company has received one or more rounds of financing, it
would get even more difficult to propose this right since later round investors might per-
ceive early round investors as seeking the right in part for themselves since they could
convert to common shares and receive the benefit of the right.
60 Bengtsson & Sensoy, supra note 2, at 2.
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another investor, and that investors will amend the arrangement when
doing so is suboptimal. One way this could occur would be if some
investors from prior rounds invest in a new round and seek an excep-
tion to the MFN clause for expansive liquidation rights. It is possible
that the benefit to those investors in the current round will outweigh
the cost they bear with respect to their investment in past rounds and
that just enough investors will reap a net benefit to support a charter
amendment.6 1 Thus the arrangement that we propose is not airtight.
In sum, this is largely a majoritarian default arrangement that
would enhance both coordination of liquidation rights among inves-
tors and the motivation of the management team while still allowing
parties to respond to situations in which deviations are needed.
2. Targeting of the Common Stock Participation Right
The Common Stock Participation Right, if triggered, not only al-
locates proceeds of a sale to common shareholders but also allocates
proceeds pro rata to the preferred shareholders. In addition, because
it is a right attached to the common stock, holders of preferred shares
may take advantage of the right by converting to common stock. The
preferred shareholders that convert will be early investors whose in-
vestment and therefore liquidation preferences are relatively small.
One could instead design the Common Stock Participation Right
so that only the original common shareholders-primarily founders
and employees-get it. The advantage of doing this would be to con-
centrate the benefit on the individuals whose incentives are the con-
cern. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it would
create a range of valuations at which the interests of the preferred
shareholders would diverge from one another (depending on the
Later-Added Liquidation Rights that would instead govern) and from
the interests of the common shareholders. The Common Stock Par-
ticipation Right, as we have defined it, would broaden support for a
sale at the relatively low valuations at which it applies. These are the
same reasons why our proposal is superior to a management
carve-out. 62
Another approach would be to provide these rights only to cur-
rent employees as of the time of the sale. This approach, however,
61 For simplicity, we have assumed throughout this Article no overlap in investors
across financing rounds. In reality, however, there is some overlap. In Fried and
Broughman's sample, forty percent of companies had inside rounds with some, but not
necessarily all, existing investors participating. See BrianJ. Broughman &Jesse M. Fried, Do
VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, 18 J. CORP. FIN.
1104, 1112 (2012) (finding that twenty-one firms out of a sample of forty-five used inside
rounds). They find, however, that inside rounds tend to be at relatively high valuations,
suggesting that investors in these rounds do not exploit their bargaining power. See id. at
1112-15.
62 See supra Part II.C.
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would ignore the incentives of employees prior to the sale. If employ-
ees see the possibility of being fired and losing these rights, their in-
centives will be impaired long before a sale materializes. In addition,
if former employees hold a significant percentage of the company's
shares, providing this right to them would help achieve the level of
shareholder support often needed for a sale.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed how the accumulation of liquidation
rights in venture capital financings can be detrimental to firm value,
both because they can create conflicting interests among investors
and because they can undermine the incentives of the management
team. Even when it is evident that accrued liquidation rights are
suboptimal, investors in a start-up rarely renegotiate them. This dual
phenomenon-the accumulation of dysfunctional rights and a failure
to renegotiate them-is familiar to practitioners and has been docu-
mented in empirical studies of venture capital financings. We pro-
pose a contractual arrangement that would reduce the likelihood of
suboptimal liquidation rights accumulating over the course of a series
of financings. The arrangement would be drafted into a start-up's
charter. The arrangement includes three elements: a liquidation
preference for preferred shareholders equal to their initial invest-
ment; an MFN clause providing that any additional liquidation right
given to a series of preferred shares will be automatically extended to
all series of preferred shares; and a Common Stock Participation
Right that would provide a start-up's management team, employees,
and other common shareholders with a specified portion of sale pro-
ceeds, up to a limit, so long as the preferred shareholders receive
their initial preference. A sale would trigger the Common Stock Par-
ticipation Right only if its proceeds are too low to provide common
shareholders with a minimum payment that the parties would specify
in the company's initial charter.
There are circumstances in which investors or a management
team will want to modify the mechanism we propose in order to at-
tract investment that would increase firm value. A situation in which
the value of the company is lower than its aggregate liquidation rights
is an example. On the other hand, there is a danger that a late-stage
investor will attempt to exert bargaining power simply to extract value
from existing investors by insisting on a modification. We propose
that a supermajority vote of the preferred shares be required to mod-
ify the MFN provision and a supermajority of the common shares be
required to amend the Common Stock Participation Right. While not
perfect-no contractual arrangement can be-this will allow flexibil-
ity while providing some ability to resist a modification that would not
increase firm value.
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APPENDIX
COMMON STOCK PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other liquidation provi-
sions contained herein (including the "Later-Added Liquidation
Rights"), in the event that (1) the Later-Added Liquidation Rights
would result in the Common Stock receiving less than fifty percent* of
the amount per share that the Common Stock would have been enti-
tled to receive had all shares of Preferred Stock been converted to
Common Stock immediately prior to distributions under the Later-
Added Liquidation Rights and (2) the following liquidation provisions
would provide the holders of Common Stock with a greater amount
per share than they would receive with the Later-Added Liquidation
Rights in effect, then the following liquidation provision shall apply in
lieu of the Later-Added Liquidation Rights.
(a) Preferred Stock Preference. In the event of any liquidation, disso-
lution, or winding up of the Corporation, either voluntary or involun-
tary, the holders of Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, prior
and in preference to any distribution of any of the assets of the Corpo-
ration to the holders of Common Stock, by reason of their ownership
thereof, an amount per share equal to the initial purchase price per
share paid to the Corporation by the original purchaser of such share
(as adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends, reclassification and the
like) for each outstanding share of Preferred Stock then held by
them. If, upon the occurrence of such event, the assets and funds
thus distributed among the holders of Preferred Stock shall be insuffi-
cient to permit the payment to such holders of the full aforesaid pref-
erential amounts, then the entire assets and funds of the Corporation
legally available for distribution shall be distributed ratably among the
holders of Preferred Stock in proportion to the preferential amount
each such holder is otherwise entitled to receive.
(b) Common Stock Participation. Upon the completion of the distri-
bution required by Section (a) above, the remaining assets of the Cor-
poration available for distribution to stockholders shall be distributed
among the holders of Preferred Stock and Common Stock pro rata
based on the number of shares of Common Stock held by each (as-
suming conversion of all such Preferred Stock into Common Stock)
until the holders shall have received an amount per share equal to
fifty percent of the amount the Common Stock would have been enti-
tled to receive had all shares of Preferred Stock been converted to
Common Stock immediately prior to the distributions described, pro-
** Here and below, the proportions would be negotiated thresholds and need not be
fifty percent.
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vided, however, that no series of Preferred Stock shall receive such a
pro rata distribution that is greater that the amount per share that
such series of Preferred Stock would have been entitled to receive
under the participation provisions of the Later-Added Liquidation
Rights. If, upon the occurrence of such event, the assets and funds
thus distributed among the holders of Preferred Stock and Common
Stock shall be insufficient to permit the payment to such holders of
the full aforesaid amounts, then the entire assets and funds of the
Corporation legally available for distribution shall be distributed rata-
bly among the holders of Preferred Stock and Common Stock in pro-
portion to the number of shares of Common Stock held by each
(assuming conversion of all such Preferred Stock into Common
Stock).
(c) Remaining Assets. Upon completion of the distribution re-
quired by Section (b) above, the remaining assets of the Corporation
available for distribution to stockholders shall be distributed among
the holders of Preferred Stock using the method and formula de-
scribed under the Later-Added Liquidation Rights, provided, how-
ever, that the distributions made under the Later-Added Liquidation
Rights shall be calculated to take into account the distributions to Pre-
ferred Stock already made under these Common Stock Liquidation
Rights as if they had been made via the Later-Added Liquidation
Rights and provided, further, however, that any further distributions
that may otherwise have been payable to the Common Stock under
the Later-Added Liquidation Rights shall not be payable to the Com-
mon Stock thereunder.
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